



THE LEGAL TENDER OASES. WHAT THEY DECIDE.
IT is purposed in the following pages to give a brief statement
of the facts and a summary of the opinion of the court in each of
those causes which have been adjudicated in the Supreme Court of
the United States, known as the "Legal Tender Cases," so far as
the constitutionality of the " legal tender clause" of the "1 currency
Acts" is involved. A similar statement and summary will also be
given of each of two other causes which bear a close relation to
the former, and are supposed to reflect the hi~tory of the animus
of the court upon this subject.
Some of the legal tender cases, in which no new principle was
decided, and still other causes in which the same subject was argued,
but which were decided on other grounds, and not thought valuable
in our present view of the matter, are purposely excluded from
consideration.
As is well known, the first act of Congress which made treas-
ury notes a legal tender, was that of February 25th 1862, and the
clause so constituting -them was couched in the following terms:
[these notes] " shall be receivable in payment of all taxes, internal
duties, excises, debts and demands of every kind due to the United
States, except duties on imports, and of all claims and' demands
against the United States, of pvery kind whatsoever, except for
interest upan bonds and notes, which shall be paid in coin: and
shall also be lawful money and' a legal tender in payment of all
debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties
on imports and interest as aforesaid."
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In the subsequent acts on this subject, substantially the same
terms were used.
I. The first case touching upon the constitutionality of the act was
that of the Bank of New York v. The Supervisors, 7 Wallace
26, brought up from the Court of Appeals of New York. There
had been assessed against the bank by the state authorities certain
taxes upon the capital stock of the bank, the payment of which
seems to have been made under protest, upon the ground that
though nominally imposed upon its capital, the tax was in fact
upon the bonds and obligations of the United States, in which the
bank's capital was invested, and which under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, it was claimed, were exempt from state
taxation. After the position of the bank, in this regard, bad been
sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, the legis-
lature of the state of New York provided by law for refunding to
the bank such taxes as had been paid by it when imposed on its
capital invested in securities of the United States exempt by law
from state taxation. The supervisors whose duty it was to audit
the claims of the bank, refused to allow the claim for exemption
from tax of the legal tender notes, and the Court of Appeals of
the state of New York supported the supervisors in that refusal.
The opinion of the court was delivered by the Chief Justice,
who said: "1 That these notes were issued under the authority of
the United States, and as a means to ends entirely within the con-
stitutional power of the government, was not seriously questioned
upon the argument. Apart from the-quality of legal tender im-
pressed upon them by Act of Congress, of which we now say
nothing, their circulation as currency depends on the extent to
-which they are received in payment, on the quantity in circula-
.ation, and on the credit given to the promises they bear. In
these respects they resemble the bank notes formerly issued as cur-
rency. * It is clear that these notes are obligations of the United
States. Their name imports obligation. * * The dollar note is
an engagement to pay a dollar, and the dollar intended is the
coined dollar of the United Stat "
The court then go on to show that Congress has provided for
the exemption of the notes from state taxation and say: "1 Our
conclusion is that United States notes are exempt; and at the
time the New York statutes were enacted were exempt from taxa-
tion by or under state authority."
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I. The next case was that of Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wallace
71, the facts being in substance as follows:
After. the passage of the Legal Tender Act the legislature of
Oregon passpci a statute, enacting that "the sheriff shall ay over
to the county treasurer the full amount of the state and school
taxes in gold and silver coin, and that the several county treasurers
shall pay over to the state treasurer the state tax in gold and
silver coin."
The state of Oregon, in April 1865, filed a complaint against
Lane county to recover $5460.96, in gold and silver coin, alleged
to be due the state.
To this complaint an answer was put in by the county, alleging
a tender in United States notes. A demurrer to the answer was
sustained by the Supreme Court of the state, and the judgment
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, on the
ground that the clause making United States notes a legal tender
for payment of debts, had no reference to taxes imposed by state
authority.
III. Bronson v. Bodes, 7 Wallace 229, next claimed the attention
of the court; the case being substantially thus: Bronson, acting
as executor, in December 1851, had taken a mortgage on certain
land in Erie county, New York, for $1400, liayable in gold and
silver coin, lawful money of the United States, which Rodes had
afterward assumed to pay. In January, 1865, Rodes tendered
Bronson United States notes to the amount of $1507, a sum nom-
inally equal to the principal and interest due. At the time of
tender one dollar in coin was equivalent in market value to two
dollars and a quarter in "Legal Tenders." The tender being
refused, the notes were deposited in bank to Bronson's credit, and
a bill was filed by Rodes to compel Bronson to satisfy the mort-
gage. The Court of Appeals of New York having decreed the
satisfaction, the case was brought to the Supreme Court of the
United States for review.
The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the court, and in it
he adverted to the fact that prior to 1837 the gold and silver
coins of the United States were made lawful tender in payments
according to their respective [actual] weight-if of full weight, at
their declared value, and if of less, at proportionate values. But
when the Act of 1837 was passed, the methods and machinery of
coinage had become so nearly perfect that the deviation in the
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weight of the respective pieces from their standard had become so
slight, that Congress provided that the gold and silver coin of the
United States should be a legal tender in all payments, according
to their respective nominal values. This course of legislation was
thought to recognise the fact "accepted by all men" that gold
and silver possessed an intrinsic value, and as a circulating me-
dium are the only proper measure of value. " A contract to pay
a certain number of dollars in gold or silver coin was said, there-
fore, to be in legal import, nothing else than an agreement to de-
liver a certain weight of standard gold or silver, to be ascertained
by a count of coins, each to be certified to contain a definite pro-
portion of that weight." He did not, therefore, suppose that it
was the purpose of the coining acts to enforce satisfaction of a
contract for bullion or gold dollars by a tender of depreciated
currency, equivalent only in nominal count to the real value
of the bullion or the coined dollars.
He did not think it necessary to examine the question whether
the clauses of the currency acts, making United States notes a
legal tender are warranted by the Constitution ; but assuming that
they are so warranted, and assuming that engagements to pay
coined dollars may be regarded as contracts to pay money rather
than as contracts to deliver a certain weight of standard gold, he
proceeded to inquire whether it would be maintained that a con-
tract to pay coined money may be satisfied by a tender of United
States notes.
He observed that the statutes authorizing coinage and making
coin dollars a legal tender, had never been repealed, and concluded
from this that there were two descriptions of money in use at the
time of the tender in this case, both made legal tender in payments,
and that contracts for either were equally sanctioned by law.
And he further argued that the currency acts themselves pro-
vided for payments in coin. Duties on imports were required to be
paid in coin., and the merchant who has the duty to pay must con-
tract for the coin in which to pay. And so the government may
need coin to fulfil its obligations, and may find it convenient to con..
tract for it, and these contracts could certainly not be satisfied with
note dollars.
It was therefore held, "1 that express contracts to pay coined dol.
lars can only be satisfied by the payment of coined dollars. That
they are not debts which may be satisfied by the tender of Ufnited
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States notes." And it was also determined, that when contracts
made payable in coin are sued upon, judgments may be entered
for coined dollars and parts of dollars; and where contracts have
been made payable in dollars generally without specifying in what
description of currency payment is to be made, judgment may be
entered generally without such specification.
In this judgment concurred all the justices except Mr Justice
MrLLER; but Mr. Justice DAvis and Mr. Justice SWAYNE expressly
limited their concurrence in the opinion to its application to the
particular case decided. a
IV. The next case was that of Butler v. Horwitz, 7 Wallace 259.'
A rent of 151. per year had been reserved in 1791 on a leasehold
renewable forever, granted on a lot of ground in Baltimore, in
current money of Maryland, payable in English golden guineas
of a stated weight, and other gold and silver at their then estab-
lished weight. On January 1st 1866, Horwitz was the owner of
the rent, and Butler of the leasehold interest in the lot, .the latter
being liable of course to pay the rent. It was agreed that 151.
was equal to $40 in gold and silver, and Butler tendered to Hor-
witz the.year's rent (840), then due, in currency. Horwitz refused
to accept it, and brought suit for the value of the gold in currency,
$1 in gold being then worth $1.45 in currency, and the court below
entered judgment in accordance with his demand for $59.71.
Butler carried the case to the Supreme Court of the United States
for review, and the Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the
court, saying that the principles which determined the case of
Bronson v. Bodes would govern in this case. He observed that
the judgment of the court below was rendered as the legal result
of two propositions: [1] That the covenant in the lease required
the delivery of a certain amount of gold and silver in payment of
the rent, and [2] That the damages for the non-performance must
be assessed in the legal tender currency.
Of the first proposition he approved, but thought the second
erroneous.
Damages he remarked, for a breach of contract must be assessed
in lawful money: that is to say, in money declared to be a legal
tender in payment, by a law made in pursuance of the Constitution
of the United States.
Not deeming the constitutionality of the legal tender acts involved
in the case in hand, he observed that there were two kinds of money
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in use under the Acts of Congress in which damages might be as-
sessed. "But the obvious intention in contracts for payment or
delivery of coin or bullion, to provide against fluctuations in the
medium of payment, warranted the inference that it was the undcr-
standing of the parties that such contracts should be satisfied,
whether before or after judgment, only by tender of coin; while
the absence of any express stipulation, as to description, in
contracts for payment in money generally, warrants the opposite
inference of an understanding between parties that such contract
may be satisfied before cr after judgment, by the tender of lawful
1noney." Ii was therefore held that the damages should have been
assessed, and judgment rendered in this case for the sum agreed
to be due, with interest, in gold and silver coin with costs.
In this judgment all the justices concurred except Mr. Justice
MILLER, who dissented, holding that the agreement was for guineas
as a commodity, and that the judgment of the court below was
right.
V. Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wallace 557. This case has not been
generally considered one of the legal tender cases, but for the
reasons above given we give a summiry of it here.
Willard, the proprietor of "Wil lard' s Hotel," in Washington
city, leased from Tayloe, "The Mansion House," adjoining the
former hotel, for the period of ten years from May 1st 1854, at a
rent of $1200 per year, and it was covenanted in the lease that
the lessor should have the option of purchasing the premises at
any time before the expiration of the term, for the sum of
$22,500, nothing being said about gold or currency. In April
1864, two weeks before the period allowed Willard for the exercise
of his option had expired (the property having greatly increased
in currency value since 1854), he gave notice of his intention to
purchase, and tendered the price in accordance with the agreed
terms in United States notes, a gold dollar being then worth about
one dollar and eighty cents in currency. The tender was refused.
and Willard filed his bill in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, praying a conveyance to him of the property.
This court dismissed the bill and the case was carried to the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. He said
that when a contract was fair in its terms when made, it was the
usual practice of courts of equity to enforce its specific execution
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* * but it was not the invariable practice. This form of relief is
not a matter of absolute right to either party, but is a matter
resting in the discretion of the court. * * In general it may be
said thiat the specific relief 'will be granted when it is apparent from
a view of all the circumstances of the particular case, that it will
subserve the ends of justice * * and not when it will work injus-
tice or hardships to either party. If, however, the specific relief
can be granted upon conditioni which will relieve the case of hard-
ship and injustice, that will be done.
Finding that Willard had used good faith in tendering what was
currently received as money and so declared to be by statute; and
had submitted to the court to say what he should pay for the con-
veyance, it was said that the only question remaining was "upon
what terms should the decree be made." It was observed, that as
gold and silver was the only currency recognised by law as the
making of the contract, and was all that the parties had in contem-
plation, it would be inequitable to compel a conveyance for a sum in
notes worth in the market, 'when tendered, only a little more than
one-half of the stipulated price in coin. And it was therefore
decreed that the conveyance should be made upon the payment of
the stipulated price in gold and silver coin. In this judgment the
Chief Justice and all the associate justices concurred, but the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice NBLSOx, expressed their inability to yield
their assent to the argument by which it was supported.
VI. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wallace 604, next claimed the at-
tention of the court.
Mrs. Hepburn in 1860 made a promissory note, by which she
agreed to pay to Henry Griswold, on the 20th day of February
1862, $11,250. Five days after the note fell due, as will be ob-
served, the first legal tender act was passed. The note remaining
unpaid suit was brought upon it in 1864, when Mrs. Hepburn
tendered $12,720, the nominal amount due, with costs in legal
tender notes. The tender was refused, and the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky held that the debt had not been thereby discharged;
and of course that a tender of the nominal amount due in legal
tender notes was not payment of a debt contracted before the
passage of the legal tender act.
The case was then brought by Mrs. Hepburn to the Supreme
Court of the United States. The Chief Justice delivered the
opinion of the court. He observed that the court was now to
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determine whether the term "debts, public and private," embraced
contracts made before as well as after the date of the acts in
question. Remarking that Congress did intend that the act should
apply to contracts made before its passage, he passed to the question,
Did Congress have the power to make these notes a legal tender
in payment of debts, which, when contracted, were payable only
in gold and silver?
It had not been contended in argument that there was any ex-
press grant of legislative power in the Constitution to make any
description of credit currency a legal tender in payment of debts.
Can it then be done in the exercise of an implied power? The
rule for the exercise of a power as implied was approved as stated
by Chief Justice MARSHALL in JcCullough v. The State of Mfary-
land, in these words, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are
constitutional."
It was then regarded as settled that the powers impliedly granted
by the Constitution were such as were "not absolutely necessary,
indeed, but appropriate, plainly adapted to constitutional and le-
gitimate ends; laws not prohibited, but consistent with the lctter
and spirit of the Constitution; laws really calculated to effect
objects intrusted to the government."
Was, then, the clause which makes United States notes a legal
tender for debts contracted prior to its enactment, a law of the
iescription stated in the rule ?
The power to establish a standard of value, to determine what
shall be lawful money, is of necessity a governmental power. But
could the power to impart these qualities to those notes when
offered in discharge of pre-existing debts be derived from the coin-
age power or from any other power expressly given? It was not
the power to coin money, or a plainly adapted means to the exer-
cise of that power, or to the power to regulate the value of coined
money of the United States or of foreign coin. Nor is the power
to make notes a legal tender the same as the power to issue notes
to be used as currency. The-court had recently held that Con-
gress, as incidental to other powers, could emit bills of credit or
notes, but it expressly declared that that decision concluded noth-
ing upon the subject of legal tenders. The history of the country
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showed a well-recognised distinction between these two powers.
The states had always been held to have the power to authorize
the issue of bills for circulation by banks or individuals, but they
were expressly prohibited from making anything but gold and sil-
ver a legal tender; and this seemed decisive of the point that the
power to issue notes and that to make them a legal tender are not
the same power.
But it had been argued that the creation of legal tenders was an
appropriate and plainly adapted means to the exercise of the power
to carry on war, to regulate commerce, and to borrow money. But
this argument proved too much, as almost every exercise of power
by the government involved the expenditure of money, and to infer
from this the power to impress the quality of legal tender upon
its obligations, would be to carry the doctrine of implied powers
far beyond any extent hitherto given to it. It asserts that, what-
ever, in any degree, provides an aid within the scope of an express
power may be done. And this doctrine would make Congress ab-
solute in the choice of means to an end, whether plainly adapted
or not, and change the nature of the government, by confusing
the boundaries of its executive and judicial with its legislative
authority.
Considering then the history of notes or bills of credit both as
legal tenders and without that quality, the court were of opinion
that the legal tender quality was not an essential part of the
vitality of such notes, and therefore * * "that an act making mere
promises to pay dollars a legal tender in payment of debts pre.
viously contracted, is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted,
really calculated to carry into effect any express power vested in
Congress; that such an act is inconsistent with the spirit of the
Constitution; that it is prohibited by the Constitution."
In this opinion concurred Justices NELSON, CLIFFORD and
FIELD; and Mr. Justice GRIER also concurred therein when the
cause was decided in conference, and when the opinion of the
Chief Justice was directed to be read; but the time of its delivery
having been postponed to accommodate the min6rity of the court,
the resignation of the last-named justice had taken effect when it
was read 9nd filed.
Justices -MILLER, SWAYNE and DAvis, dissented.
II. Parker v. -Davis and Knox v. Lee, 12 Wallace 457. These
causes were argued and decided together. The case in the first was
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as follows: Before the legal tender acts were passed Parker sold
Davis a lot of ground for a given sum of money, which the former
refused on demand to convey. Davis, thereupon (also before the
legal tender acts were passed) filed a bill in equity to compel per-
formance. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in February
1867, decided that upon Davis's paying into court a certain sum
of money in legal tender notes, Parker should execute a deed to
him. Davis paid in the money, but Parker appealed from the
lecree.
The facts in Knox v. Lee, so far as they affect the question of
legal tender, were as follows: Mrs. Lee, a resident of Pennsyl-
vania, owned a flock of sheep, which she left in Texas at the out-
break of the rebellion, and they were confiscated and sold by the
confederate authorities in March 1863, as the property of an
"alien enemy." The sheep were bought by Knox, against whom
Mrs. Lee, after the suppression of the rebellion, brought suit for
taking and converting them. The court, in charging the jury,
said that in assessing damages the jury would recollect that the
judgment to be entered on their verdict could be discharged by
paying the amount in legal tender notes. Of this instruction the
defendant complained, because the jury had been led by it, as he
alleged, to improperly increase the damages, and he claimed that
as United States notes had been made a legal tender by law, there
was no difference in value between a dollar note and a coin dollar-
The court, by a majority of one, ordered : That in addition to
the regular counsel engaged in the causes, Mr. Potter and the
Attorney-General (Mr. Akerman), be heard upon the following
questions:
1. Are the legal tender acts constitutional as to contracts made
before their passage?
2. Are they valid as applied to transactions since their passage?
Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court. He ob-
served that the question was: Could Congress give treasury notes
the character and quality of money P
He said it had always been the rule to presume that Congress
have not transcended their power until the contrary was clearly
shown, and that the language of constitutions, as well as of wills.
contracts and statutes, was to be construed so as to effect the
general purpose of the instrument; and," indeed, that, by reason
of the general terms of the Constitution, there was the greater ne-
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cessity for the application of this rule in construing it. Thus the
power to collect taxes, to support armies and maintain a navy, are
instruments for a paramount object, which was to establish a
government sovereign within its sphere, and with a capacity for
self-preservation. And so of those powers granted in the general
terms to " make all lawi necessary and proper," to carry into
execution the specified powers.
And it is not indispensable to the exercise of a power that it
should be specified or clearly and directly traceable to some one
of the powers specified in the Constitution. Its existence may be
deduced from more than one of the substantive powers, or all of
them combined. That such was the understanding of the people
was shown by the amendments, which were restrictions on powers
not expressly granted nor impliable from any one other power ex-
pressly granted. And Congress had frequently exercised such
" resulting powers ;" among them that of passing a penal code, ir
which provision is made for the punishment of a large class of
crimes other than those mentioned in the Constitution, and som
of the punishments prescribed are manifestly not in aid of an:
single substantive power; and this exercise of power was sustaineii
by the Supreme Court. Reviewing the history of the governmeni
upon this point he referred to the provision m*ade under the powel
to establish post-offices and post-roads, for carrying the mails, pun
ishing theft of letters, and transporting the mails to foreign coun-
tries; under the power to regulate commerce, for the improvemen
of harbors, the erection of light-houses, the registry, enrolment anJ
construction of ships, and the passage of a code for the govern-
ment of seamen. It was also said that under the same powers an,"
other powers over the revenue and the currency of the country, fc
the convenience of the treasury and internal commerce, the Unite, i
States Bank, a private corporation, was created; and to its capitv
the government subscribed one-fifth of the stock. Its incorpo-
ration was a constitutional exercise of congressional power for nc,
other reason than that it was deemed to be a convenient instru-
ment or means for accomplishing one or more of the ends for
which the government was established. In .Fisher v. Blight, the
Supreme Court had determined that Congress must possess the
choice of means and must be empowered to use any means which
are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the
Constitution.
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And in McCullouh v. Maryland, it was finally settled that the
necessity referred to in the power granted to pass laws, "necessary
and proper" for the execution of the powers expressly granted, wa
not to be understood to be an absolute necessity; but that the legis-
lature must have that discretion in the choice of means in exe-
cuting a power which will enable it to perform its duty in the
the manner most beneficial to the people. It was there said that
when an Act of Congress "is not prohibited and is really calcu-
lated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to
undertake in the Supreme Court to inquire into the degree of its
necessity, would be to pass the line wh~ich circumscribes the ju-
dicial department and to tread on legislative grolrmd."
Before the court, therefore, could hold the Legal Tender Acts
unconstitutional, it must be convinced they were not appropriate
means, in any degree, or means conducive to the execution of any
or all of the powers of Congress, or of the government, or it must
hold that they were prohibited. And in determining their appro-
priateness, the time of their enactment was an important consider-
ation.
If nothing else, it was asked, could have supplied the needs of
the treasury and saved the government, while the Legal Tender
Acts would, could their constitutionality be denied ? That they
did work such results, it was said, could.not be disputed.
But if something else could have done the same, it does not
impair the argument. Congress had the choice of means appro-
priate to a legitimate end, and the court could not inquire into
the degree of their necessity or appropriateness.
It had not been claimed, it was said, that the exercise of this
power was expressly prohibited, but that the spirit of the Consti-
tution was violated by it.
As to the grant of power to "1 coin money" being an implied
prohibition to make that money which was not a subject of coinage,
it was said that the principle on which this construction was con-
tended for had not been recognised. In United States v. Alari.
gold, 9 Howard 560, it had been held that an express power to
punish a certain class of crimes, was not regarded as an objection
to deducing authority to punish other crimes from another sub-
stantive and defined grant of power; and a similar principle had
been recognised in other decisions.
In answer to the argument that the spirit of the Constitution
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was violated because these acts impaired the obligation of contracts,
it was said that of course it related only to such contracts as ex-
isted before February 1862-when the first act was passed. But
it was denied that the acts did impair the obligation of contracts;
and also that Congress is prohibited frem producing that effect.
As to the first proposition it was said that the contracts of par-
ties simply. involved the obligation to pay "money," and that
meant what should by law be recognised as money when the con-
tract came to be performed. It was also maintained that Congress
could indirectly impair the obligation of contracts; as by the pas-
sage of non-intercourse acts, declaring war, directing an embargo,
and the like; and the right to produce this effect was not confined
to the cases where the contract was impaired by the exercise of a
power expressly granted. The power to direct an embargo was
one of the auxiliary powers, held to be vested in Congress, though
the effect of its exercise was to suspend many contracts, and render
performance of others impossible. Contracts were, in fact, always
subject, in a state of civil society, to the lawful exercise of the
rightful authority of the government.1
In regard to the acts infracting the clause of the Constitution
which forbids the taking of private property for public use, it was
said that the-provision had always been understood as referring
only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries
resulting from the exercise of lawful -power. A new tariff, a war
or an embargo may entail loss or render valuable property almost
valueless, and the reduction of the intrinsic value of the coin of
the government had the effect to subject creditors to corresponding
loss, but these effects did not make the laws causing them uncon-
stitutional.
The court, therefore, held the acts constitutional as applied to
contracts made either before or after their passage; and in so
I It may be remarked in this connection that Mr. Potter in his argument
against the constitutionality of these acts on this ground, had said that he was not
unmindful of the impression that prevailed in the profession that Congress cou.,l
pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract. He contended, however, that
the impression was traceable to an interlocutory remark of Mr. Justice WASlUNG-
TON, in the Circuit Court in Philadelphia, in 1816, in reference to a grant by the
government of a patent for an invention, and that it was a single instance of a
casual observation, passing for years unaffirmed and unchallenged by all the gres
commentators upon the Constitution.
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holding, overruled so much of Hepburn v. Griswold, as held the
acts unwarranted by the Constitution, so far as they apply to con-
tracts made before their enactment.
In this opinion concurred Justices CLIFFORD, SWAYNE, MILLER
and BRADLEY. And the Chief Justice, with Justices NELSON.
CLIFFORD and FIELD, dissented.
VIII. The next case was that of Trebilcock v. Wilson et ux., 12
Wallace 687. The facts affecting the question of legal tender
were as follows: In June 1861, Wilson gave to Trebilcock his note
at one year for $900, payable in specie, and he also delivered to
Trebilcock a mortgage made by himself and wife as security for the
debt. In February 1863, Wilson tendered the amount of the
debt in legal tenders, which Trebilcock refused to receive. Wilson
and wife then filed a bill in equity against Trebilcock to compel
satisfaction of the mortgage.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court: saying
that the terms in specie did not assimilate the note to an instru-
ment in which the amount stated was payable in chattels; the
terms in specie being descriptive of the kind of dollars in which
the note was payable, both specie and currency dollars being
recognised by law and usage among traders, merchants and bank-
ers. The case was therefore brought within the decision of
Bronson v. Bodes, and the debt could only be satisfied by the pay-
ment of coined dollars. The coinage acts were in force when the
legal tender acts were passed, and not being repealed by them and
they being held to be constitutional, we had, according to that
decision, two kinds of money, essentially different in their nature
but equally lawful.
In this opinion the Chief Justice and all the justices concurred,
except Justices MILLER and BRADLEY, who dissented.
IX. The Vaughan and Telegraph, 14 Wallace 258. On the 7th
of October 1864, 0. & J. Lynch, of St. Timothy, Canada, shipped a
cargo of barley on a canal boat for New York. In Canada, as is
known, business is transacted on a specie basis and with a coinage
corresponding with our own. The cargo was worth on that day at
St. Timothy, $2486 in gold, or at the then rate of depreciation,
about $4896.80 in legal tender notes-gold selling at that time at
$2.01. The boat with her cargo was sunk in the Hudson, by the
joint negligence of the steamers, "Vaughan " and "Telegraph,"
both of which were libelled by the consignees who had made ad-
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vances on the cargo. The District Court of the United States at
New York entered a decree on February 21st 1868, against both
steamers, for the value of the barley in gold at St. Timothy, on
the day 6f shipment, with interest, and assessed the damages at
$2924.20; but the decree was not by its terms made payable in
gold. On appeal, the Circuit Court held that in order to give full
indemnity to the libellants, the decree should have been for the
value in legal tender notes (84896.80) of the $2436 gold, and this
court, on March 26th 1870, entered a decree for the $4896.80 with
interest; in all $6515.51, with costs. One dollar in gold was at
this date worth $1.12 in legal tenders.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Jus-
tice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court, saying:
" Upon the rule of damages applied by both courts as respects
the kind of currency in which the value of the barley was esti-
mated, the libellants were entitled, upon the plainest principles of
justice, to be paid in specie or its equivalent. The hardship
arising from the decree before us is due entirely to the delay in
its payment which has since occurred, and the change which time
and circumstances have wrought in the value of the legal tender
currency. The decree was right when rendered, and, being so,
cannot now be disturbed. * * The decree in the particular con-
sideration presents the same question which was decided by this
court in the case of Knox v. Lee."
In this judgment concurred, Justices NELSON, MILLER, DAVIS
STRONG and BRADLEY.
The Chief Justice, with Justices CLIFFORD and FIELD, dissented.
In. conclusion, then, it may be said that the law, as determined
by the foregoing cases, is as follows:
1. In The Bank v. The Supervisors, it is decided that legal tender
notes are obligations or securities of the United States, and are
exempt from state taxation; and that they are not money in the
same sense, as gold and silver coin of the United States is money.
2. In Lane County v. Oregon, it is decided that a state tax is not
a "debt" within the meaning of the legal tender acts, and that
where a state requires its taxes to be paid in coin they cannot be
discharged by a tender of treasury notes.
3. In Bronson v. Bode.s, it is decided that a debt created prior tc,
the passage of the legal tender acts, and payable by the express
terms of the contract, in gold and silver coin, lawful money of the
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United States, cannot be satisfied by a tender of treasury Potes
nominally equal in amount to the debt, and that judgments on
such contracts should be expressly entered for coined dollars and
parts of dollars.
4. In Butler v. Horwitz, it is decided that where a contract,
made before the passage of the legal tender acts, calls for a stated
sum of money current in the state where the contract is made, and
requires payment to be made in specified gold and silver coins, of
a specified weight not of the United States coinage, the damages
must be assessed in, and judgment rendered for, coined dollars and
parts of dollars and not for dollars generally, by taking into
account in assessing damages, the difference in market value
between coin and currency dollars.
5. In Willard v. Tayloe, it is decided that where a contract
was made before the passage of the legal tender acts, specific per-
formance thereof will not be decreed upon the tender of the
amount of the debt in treasury notes when such a decree would
work inequity or injustice; but that upon the payment of the
amount of the debt in coin, and the case is otherwise a proper one
for such interposition by the court, specific performance will be
decreed.
6. In Hfepburn v. Griswold, it was decided that a contract made
before the passage of the legal tender acts and solvable in dollars
generally cannot be discharged in legal tender notes, nominally
equal in amount to the debt, and that those acts are unconstitu-
tional so far as they seek to make such notes a legal tender in dis-
charge of free-existing debts.
". In Parker v. Davis, it is decided that the legal tender acts
are constitutional, as applied to pre-existing contracts, and Hep-
burn v. Griswold is overruled in this iegard. And it also holds
that specific performance of such engagements, when the case is
otherwise a proper one for such interposition by the court, will be
enforced. It does not appear in this case whether the court based
its decree for specific performance upon the finding of the court
below that such a decree would be equitable, or upon its own judg-
ment to this effect, or upon other grounds.
8. In Knox v. Lee it is decided that it is not error to instruct
the jury that in assessing damages against one for a tortious con-
version of property after the passage of the legal tender acts, they
will take the fact into account that the judgment on their v,.
